Theories in favor of deliberative democracy are based on the premise that social information processing can improve group beliefs. While research on the "wisdom of crowds" has found that information exchange can increase belief accuracy on non-controversial factual matters, theories of political polarization imply that groups will become more extreme-and less accurate-when beliefs are motivated by partisan political bias. A primary concern is that partisan biases are associated not only with more extreme beliefs, but also a diminished response to social information. While bipartisan networks containing both Democrats and Republicans are expected to promote accurate belief formation, politically homogeneous networks are expected to amplify partisan bias and reduce belief accuracy. To test whether the wisdom of crowds is robust to partisan bias, we conducted two web-based experiments in which individuals answered factual questions known to elicit partisan bias before and after observing the estimates of peers in a politically homogeneous social network. In contrast to polarization theories, we found that social information exchange in homogeneous networks not only increased accuracy but also reduced polarization. Our results help generalize collective intelligence research to political domains. networks-containing members of only one political party-52 will reverse the expected learning effects of social information 53 processing and instead amplify partisan biases (9, 25, 26).
exchange can improve group accuracy even as individuals 23 become more similar (13, 14) . This effect can be explained 24 by the observation that individuals who are more accurate 25 revise their answers less in response to social information, thus 26 pulling the mean belief toward the true answer (13, 15) . 27 While such results are promising, political beliefs are shaped 28 by cognitive biases that are not present in the nonpartisan 29 estimation tasks (e.g., distance estimates) that have frequently 30 been employed in experimental studies of the wisdom of crowds 31 (11, 13, 14) . A key finding of political attitude research is that 32 partisan bias can shape not only value statements but also be-33 liefs about facts (16) (17) (18) (19) . Such biases persist even when survey 34 respondents are offered a financial incentive for their accuracy 35 (17, 20) . One explanation for the emergence of partisan bias 36 in factual beliefs is motivated reasoning (21) . Motivated rea-37 soning results from the psychological preference for cognitive 38 consistency, which means that people will adjust their beliefs 39 to be consistent with each other (22) . This preference can 40 affect political attitudes, such that people will adjust their be-41 liefs about the world to support their preferences for different 42 parties or politicians (18) .
43
Even when inaccurate beliefs are shaped by motivated rea-44 soning and when corrected beliefs would be less supportive 45 of party loyalties, experimental evidence suggests that ac-46 curacy can be improved by information exposure (23) . In 47 politically heterogeneous networks containing both Democrats 48 and Republicans, social influence has been found to improve 49 belief accuracy and reduce partisan biases (20, 24) . However, 50 theories of political polarization suggest that homogeneous 51 networks-containing members of only one political party-52 will reverse the expected learning effects of social information 53 processing and instead amplify partisan biases (9, 25, 26).
54
The risk of homogeneous networks derives from the expec-55 tation that response to social information on partisan topics 56 is correlated with belief extremity, rather than belief accuracy 57 (25, 26) . However, previous research on political polarization 58 (9, 16, 26) has been concerned primarily with attitude dif-59 ferences, and has not directly examined the effect of social
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Experimental Design
87
Following a pre-registered experimental design, our first ex- were not informed that they were observing the responses by 124 people who shared their partisan preferences.
125
We controlled for question order effects by using four ques-126 tion sets, each of which were identical except for the order in 127 which questions were presented (see SI Appendix). For each 128 question set, we collected data for 3 networked groups and 129 1 control group for each political party (i.e., 4 independent 130 groups for each party). In total, we collected data for 12 131 networks and 4 control groups for each party (1,120 subjects 132 in total). Figure S1 (SI Appendix) illustrates our experimental 133 design.
134
The experimental questions have true answers with values 135 ranging from 4.9 to 224,600,000. In order to compare across 136 questions, we follow similar studies (11) and log-transform all 137 responses and true values prior to analysis using the natural 138 logarithm. This allows for comparison across conditions be-139 cause log(A)-log(B) approximates percent difference, and thus 140 calculated errors for each response are approximately equal 141 to percent error. This also accounts for the observation that 142 estimates of this type are frequently distributed log-normally 143 (11, 28). We find that alternative normalization procedures 144 produce comparable results (SI Appendix).
145
Because responses by individuals within a social network 146 are not independent, we measure all outcomes at the trial 147 level. To produce this metric, we first calculate the mean 148 (logged) belief of the 35 responses given for a single round of 149 a single question in a single trial. We then measure group 150 error for each round of each question as the absolute value 151 of the arithmetic difference between the mean (logged) belief 152 and the (logged) true value. We then measure the change in 153 error for each question of each trial as the arithmetic difference 154 between the error of the mean at Round 1 and the error of the 155 mean at Round 3. This method produces four measurements 156 of change in error for each trial, i.e. one for each question. We 157 then calculate the average of this value over all four questions 158 completed by each trial to measure average change in error for 159 each trial. We thus produce 24 independent observations of 160 the effect of social influence on group accuracy when beliefs are 161 motivated by partisan bias, including 12 independent observa-162 tions of Republican networks and 12 independent observations 163 of Democrat networks. In addition, we produce 8 independent 164 control observations, including 4 independent observations of 165 Republican control groups and 4 independent observations of 166 Democrat control groups.
167
We replicated this entire design in a second experiment, 168 with modifications intended to increase the effect of partisan 169 bias on responses to social information. We describe this 170 replication below.
171
Results (Experiment 1)
172
We find no evidence that social influence in homogeneous 173 networks either reduces accuracy or increases polarization on 174 factual beliefs. Instead, we find that social influence increased 175 accuracy for both Republicans and Democrats and also de-176 creased polarization despite the absence of between-group ties. 177 We begin our analysis by confirming that in Experiment 1, 178 subjects' independent beliefs demonstrated partisan bias, as 179 expected based on previous research (5, 17, 20) . In Round 180 D R A F T To test whether this change could be explained by random we find that error at Round 3 was significantly lower than error 205 at Round 1 for every one of the 12 Republican trials (P<0.001) 206 as well as every one of the 12 Democrat trials (P<0.001) in 207 Experiment 1. Across both Republicans and Democrats, we 208 find that the average error of the mean decreased by 35% from 209 Round 1 to Round 3.
210
One possibility is that improvement in the social condition 211 is due to the opportunity for subjects to revise their answers. 212 To test whether this is the case, we compared improvement in 213 the social condition with improvement in the control condition. 214 Following the procedure described above, we calculate the 215 average change in error for the 24 social network trials and 216 the 8 control trials, shown in Figure 2 . We find that error did 217 decrease slightly in the control condition (P<0.15), but that 218 the change in the social condition was significantly greater than 219 the control condition (P<0.03), indicating that the reduction 220 in error in homogeneous social networks cannot be explained 221 by individual learning effects. The error of the mean in control 222 groups decreased by only 15%, a substantially smaller change 223 than the 35% decrease in social networks. Thus while providing 224 individuals the opportunity to revise their answer may improve 225 belief accuracy, these results suggest that social information 226 processing-even in homogeneous partisan groups-can help 227 counteract the effects of partisan bias.
228
Another possibility is that individuals became less accurate 229 even as the group mean became more accurate, which would 230 occur if individual beliefs become more widely dispersed-e.g., 231 if moderates and extremists moved in opposite directions. 232 To investigate this possibility, we first measure the standard 233 deviation of responses by each of the 24 networked groups in 234 Experiment 1 before and after information exchange, averaging 235 across all four questions. We find that standard deviation 236 decreased significantly from Round 1 to Round 3 in social 237 networks (P<0.001) but did not significantly change for control 238 groups (P=0.25). We find that the change in networks was 239
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suggesting that information exchange in homogeneous social 241 networks leads to increased similarity among group members.
242
We also directly test the effect of social influence on aver- In addition to selecting more controversial questions, we also 298 modified the experimental interface to include partisan primes 299 that have been shown in prior research (20) to enhance the 300 effects of partisan bias on social information processing. First, 301 we required all subjects to confirm their political party prior 302 to entering the experimental interface, to prime them to the 303 political nature of the study. Second, we included an image of 304 an elephant and a donkey (i.e., symbols for the Democratic and 305 Republican parties) on the experimental interface (see Fig. S3 306 in the SI Appendix). Third, for subjects in the social condition, 307 we indicated the party membership of other subjects in the 308 study when providing social information. Finally, subjects 309 upon recruitment were invited to participate in the "Politics 310 Challenge," and the URL to the web platform included the 311 phrase "Politics Challenge."
312
Questions in this second experiment allowed negative an-313 swers, for which the logarithm is not defined, and so we normal-314 ize results by dividing by the true answer, which also represents 315 percent difference. However, this method leaves our analysis 316 extremely sensitive to large values as might occur through 317 typographic error. While these extreme values do not change 318 our statistical analysis, the inclusion of all responses yields 319 implausible effect sizes. (For example, we find that error in 320 the social condition decreased by 3.6x10
7 % while error in the 321 control groups increased by 5.3x10 4 %.) We therefore present 322 results in the main text and figures after manually removing 323 extremely large values, a process which impacts fewer than 1% 324 of responses. An analysis that includes all submitted responses 325 is provided in the SI Appendix.
326
Replication Results. As with Experiment 1, we begin our repli-327 cation analysis by ensuring that subjects showed partisan 328 bias, finding significant differences between Republicans and 329 Democrats for all four questions (P<0.001). For the question 330 on unemployment, which was re-used from Experiment 1 and 331 reframed to emphasize change, we now observe a meaningful 332 split between the two parties: a majority (54%) of Democrats 333 stated that unemployment decreased under Obama, while a 334 majority (67%) of Republicans stated the opposite. Nonethe-335 less, the overall numeric bias was still in the same direction: 336 the mean answer for both parties was an overestimate. As 337 this example shows, divergent beliefs between Democrats and 338 Republicans can nonetheless generate numeric estimation bias 339 in the same direction.
340 Figures 1 and 2 show outcomes of the replication. We again 341 find that social influence increased the accuracy of mean beliefs 342 for both Democrats (P<0.03) and Republicans (P<0.001). 343 Across all trials, we found that the error of the mean decreased 344 by 31% for subjects in the social condition, approximately the 345 same effect size observed in Experiment 1. In contrast, we 346 saw a 4% increase in error for the control condition, though 347 this change was not statistically significant (P>0.46). The two 348 conditions were significantly different (P<0.002), indicating 349 that the benefits of social information cannot be explained by 350 individual learning effects. 
377
We measured polarization using two outcomes. 
392
As a second measure of polarization, Figure 3 ( We observed that the mean response to objective, fact-based 414 questions became more accurate as a result of social influence, 415 despite the fact that beliefs were shaped by partisan bias 416 and individuals were embedded in politically homogeneous 417 social networks. In contrast to theories of polarization (26), 418 our results are consistent with the explanation that accurate 419 individuals exert the greatest influence on factual political 420 beliefs as predicted by prior research on the wisdom of crowds 421 (13) . In the context of growing concerns about the effects of 422 partisan echo chambers, our results suggest that deliberative 423 democracy may be possible even in politically segregated social 424 networks. Homogeneous social networks, such as those we 425 study, are not on their own sufficient to increase partisan 426 political polarization.
427
This finding, however, presents a tension: information ex-428 change can mitigate partisan bias, yet public opinion remains 429 polarized. Although we observe decreased polarization and 430 increased accuracy, some error remains as well as some differ-431 ences between political parties. Polarization can exist despite 432 the potential for social learning. The co-existence of polar-433 ization and social learning may be due to structural factors 434 such as network centralization (i.e., the presence of dispropor-435 tionately central individuals), which can generate and sustain 436 belief polarization in social networks. Network centralization 437 in general has been found to undermine the wisdom of crowds 438 (13) ; and the ability to obtain central positions in social net-439 works (e.g., through broadcast media or web-based platforms) 440 could allow extremists to exert disproportional influence on 441 group beliefs. In simulation (SI Appendix) we find that a 442 correlation between belief extremity and social network cen-443 trality can cause the wisdom of crowds to fail, such that social 444 influence simply enhances existing partisan bias, as predicted 445 by the law of group polarization.
446
In considering the limitations of our study, it is important 447 to address the generalizability of our research. One concern is 448 that our subject population is not a nationally representative 449 sample; Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) attracts subjects 450 who are younger and more digitally sophisticated than the gen-451 D R A F T eral population (29 
Materials and Methods
499
Subjects provided informed consent prior to entering the experi- 
